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Abstract 
This paper examines the type of compliance and enforcement mechanisms that should be 
included in proposed instrument to be negotiated under the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea in relation to the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in 
areas beyond national jurisdiction.  The paper also examines the literature as to why states do 
or do not comply with international law and makes recommendations of compliance and 
enforcement mechanisms informed by those compliance theories. 
 
Word length 
The text of this paper (excluding table of contents, abstract, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 7350 words. 
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I  Introduction 
For more than ten years, a working group of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
has been considering issues related to the conservation and sustainable use of marine 
biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction.  On the recommendation of this working 
group, the UNGA passed a resolution earlier this year to:1 
 
develop an international legally binding instrument under the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS]2 on the conservation and sustainable use of marine 
biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction 
 
The resolution goes on to specify four topics on which states will negotiate,3 two relating to 
tools to conserve the marine environment (area-based management tools, including marine-
protected areas, and the requirements for and of environmental impact assessments) while the 
other two raise distributive justice questions (sharing the benefits of marine genetic resources 
(MGRs) and capacity-building and the transfer of marine technology).  In addition to setting 
the substantive issues for states to negotiate, the resolution provides parameters for the 
negotiations including that agreement on all of the issues must be negotiated within the context 
of already existing agreements and institutions; any agreement “should not undermine existing 
relevant legal instruments and frameworks and relevant global, regional and sectoral bodies”.4  
The resolution also specifies that the committee preparing the draft text should “exhaust all 
efforts” to reach consensus on substantive issues in order that any legally binding instrument 
secures “the widest possible acceptance.”5  
 
This paper will examine what mechanisms the proposed instrument should contain to 
encourage compliance with the legal rules in the first instance (“compliance mechanisms”)6 
and to address non-compliance (“enforcement mechanisms”).  Part II of this paper will examine 
the concepts of compliance and enforcement in relation to international law generally, and 
international environmental law in particular. Part III will examine the existing legal 
frameworks and institutions relating to conservation of marine biodiversity in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction (“ABNJ”).  Part IV will identify the gaps the proposed instrument is likely 
to fill while Part V will set out the types of compliance and enforcement mechanisms that could 
                                                 
1 Development of an internationally binding instrument under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction 
GA Res 69/292 A/RES/69/292 (2015) at [1]. 
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1833 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 10 December 1982, 
entered into force 16 November 1994). 
3 GA Res 69/292, above n 1, at [2]. 
4 At [1(g) – (h)]. 
5 At [3]. 
6 Teall Crossen “Multilateral environmental agreements and the compliance continuum” (2003) 16 Geo. Int'l 
Envtl. L. Rev. 473 at 478. 
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be utilized within it and suggest which mechanisms would be most applicable.  Part VI will 
summarise and conclude the paper. 
 
II Compliance with international law  
The international legal system is defined by state sovereignty.7  Each state is sovereign in its 
own territory but the international system itself exists in a state of anarchy (in the neorealist 
sense) as there is no international government requiring states to comply with particular rules.8  
States are therefore only bound by rules or law that they agree to be bound by.9 Owing to the 
consensual nature of international law, a state has to agree to a mechanism by which the law 
can be enforced against it.  This places constraints on the types of mechanisms that international 
agreements can contain: states will not sign up to obligations that they are likely to breach if 
there are going to be severe sanctions on that breach.  Given the value in continual engagement 
with other states on important issues, international agreements have to strike a balance so that 
the obligations entered into will encourage desired outcomes but without being so onerous as 
to discourage general ratification of the agreement. 10   The form of the compliance and 
enforcement mechanisms within those agreements are very important tools in striking that 
balance. 
A Distinguishing compliance, implementation, effectiveness and enforcement 
Compliance can be defined as “a state of conformity or identity between an actor’s behavior 
[sic] and a specified rule.”11  Closely related to the concept of compliance are the concepts of 
implementation and effectiveness.  Implementation is defined as “the process of putting 
international commitments into practice: the passage of legislation, creation of institutions 
(both domestic and international) and enforcement of rules.”12  In practice implementation of 
commitments is “frequently critical” for compliance but it is possible in some situations for an 
actor to comply without needing to take any steps of implementation.  The concept of 
“effectiveness” can be defined in varying ways including as “the degree to which a rule induces 
changes in behavior [sic] that further the rule’s goals; improves the state of the underlying 
                                                 
7 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes The New Sovereignty: compliance with international regulatory 
agreements (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1995) 
8 Kenneth N. Waltz Theory of international politics (Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, California, 1979) at 
89. 
9 See for instance Thomas M. Franck Fairness in international law and institutions (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1995) at 28. 
10 George W Downs, David M Rocke and Peter N Barsoom “Is the good news about compliance good news about 
cooperation?” (1996) 50 International Organization 379 at 399; Andrew T Guzman “A compliance-based theory 
of international law” (2002) 90 California Law Review 1823 at 1856. 
11 Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter “International law, international relations and compliance” in W. 
Carlsnaes and others (eds) Handbook of international relations (Sage, London, 2002) 538 at 539. 
12 At 539. 
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problem or achieves its policy objective”. 13  In the context of multilateral environmental 
agreements, effectiveness is often defined in relation to “whether the state of the environment 
has improved”.14  High levels of compliance and effectiveness will not coincide when the 
commitments or rules are set at too low a level to solve the problem targeted by that rule.   
 
Enforcement can be defined as compelling an actor to comply with a law or rule. 15   
International agreements usually contain dispute resolution clauses that determine whether and 
how a state can take an action against another state.  In addition to dispute resolution 
mechanisms, agreements may contain “penalties, sanctions, or other coercive measures to 
induce compliance with obligations.” 16   In the context of international environmental 
agreements, sanctions are rare, with emphasis tending to be placed on incentives and 
“sunshine” policies, both of which fit into the category of compliance mechanisms.17  A 
number of international environmental agreements also have “non-compliance procedures”18 
which are a combination of compliance and enforcement mechanisms.  Usually the relevant 
treaty organisation or the non-complying state will refer the state to a “Compliance Committee” 
which examines the reasons why a state is not complying and offers assistance.  The Committee 
may also have more coercive powers.19 
 
For the purposes of this paper, “compliance mechanisms” are defined as mechanisms to 
encourage compliance with international law in the first instance (including by encouraging 
implementation of the relevant rules) and “enforcement mechanisms” are defined as 
mechanisms to address non-compliance.  There is some overlap between the two categories - 
the mere fact of having the possibility of enforcement in relation to an instrument will 
encourage compliance even if the mechanisms never have to be utilised. 
B Why do states comply with international law? 
Given that there is no-one forcing states to comply with international law, it might be expected 
that states would not enter into many international legal arrangements and that if they did, that 
they would not comply with those rules unless it is clearly to their benefit.  In practice, states 
                                                 
13 At 539. 
14 Crossen, above n 6, at 478. 
15 See the definition of “enforce” in Catherine Soanes and Angus Stevenson (eds) Concise Oxford English 
Dictionary (11th ed (revised, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) at 472. 
16 Edith Brown Weiss “Understanding Compliance with International Environmental Agreements: The Baker's 
Dozen Myths” (1998) 32 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1555 at 1564. 
17 At 1588. 
18  Karen N. Scott “Non-compliance procedures and dispute resolution mechanisms under international 
environmental agreements” in Duncan French, Matthew Saul, and Nigel D. White (eds) International law and 
dispute settlement: new problems and techniques (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2010) 225. 
19 At 233. 
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spend a long time negotiating international agreements20 and on the whole are thought to 
comply with most of their obligations most of the time.21  However, there is debate as to why 
states comply with international law and consequently debate as to what mechanisms will be 
most effective in encouraging compliance.  In particular, scholars differ over the importance 
of coercive enforcement mechanisms in encouraging compliance with international 
environmental agreements (IEAs),22 ranging from the Chayeses’ managerial model in which 
coercive enforcement is seen as ineffectual and costly23 to the “enforcement” model of Downs 
et al who maintain that any IEA that requires deep cooperation between states will require strict 
sanctions to deter non-compliance.24   
 
According to Mitchell, compliance theories can also be categorised on the basis of two different 
behavioural logics – the logic of consequences or the logic of appropriateness.25  Theories 
based on the logic of consequences emphasise that states are rational actors with goals who 
weigh the costs and benefits of potential actions before they take them.  On this basis, states 
comply with international law when it is in their interests to do so.  IEAs influence behaviour 
by changing the costs and benefits of particular actions.26  In contrast, theories based on the 
logic of appropriateness emphasise the role of state identity in compliance with international 
law.  Rather than calculating costs and benefits, states ask “what is the ‘right’ thing to do in 
this situation for someone like me?”27  IEAs influence state behaviour by codifying norms, 
thereby designating behaviour that is appropriate or inappropriate for the type of actor that a 
state seeks or sees itself as being.28  The following sections will survey a few of the main 
compliance theories, in preparation for an analysis in Part IV of this paper as to the types of 
compliance and enforcement mechanisms that would be appropriate to encourage compliance 
with the proposed instrument filling the gaps identified in Part III. 
1 The managerial model 
The Chayeses in their book “New Sovereignty”29 promote a managerial model of compliance, 
arguing that coercive enforcement mechanisms are of little importance when it comes to 
encouraging compliance with treaties.  After reviewing the use of military, economic and 
                                                 
20 Guzman, above n 10, at 1837. 
21 Raustiala and Slaughter, above n 11, at 540, quoting Henkin’s famous aphorism. 
22 Crossen, above n 6, at 481. 
23 Chayes and Chayes, above n 7. 
24 Downs et al, above n 10. 
25 Ronald B. Mitchell “Compliance theory: compliance, effectiveness, and behaviour change in international 
environmental law” in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunee, and Ellen Hey (eds) The Oxford handbook of international 
environmental law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) at 901. 
26 At 902. 
27 At 902. 
28 At 902. 
29 Chayes and Chayes, above n 7. 
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membership sanctions over the course of the second half of the twentieth century, the Chayeses 
come to the conclusion that sanctions have been used rarely and to relatively little effect 
compared to the political and economic cost on the state or states imposing the sanctions.30  
According to the Chayeses, compliance with international law occurs because: it is efficient 
(in that states do not have to constantly recalculate the costs and benefits of the agreement); it 
will usually be in the state’s self-interest to comply (as states will not negotiate or enter into 
agreements that are contrary to their interests); and because norms support compliance with 
international law.31  Non-compliance is viewed not as a result of willful disobedience but as a 
result of “ambiguities in the terms of an obligation, lack of capacity to carry out an obligation, 
and a change in circumstances.” 32  These causes of non-compliance are not amenable to 
coercive enforcement.  To maintain compliance at an acceptable level, the fundamental 
instrument to do so is “an iterative process of discourse among the parties, the treaty 
organisation, and the wider public.”33  The tools used within a managerial compliance regime 
include reporting, verification and monitoring, dispute resolution and capacity building. 34  
These tools are used to try and persuade a state to change its ways.  Underpinning the Chayeses 
argument that such methods will actually encourage compliance is their view of sovereignty in 
the contemporary interdependent international system as “status – the vindication of the state’s 
existence as a member of the international system.”  Without that status, states are unable to 
realize their potential for economic growth and political influence. 35  The Chayeses also 
highlight the role of international treaty organisations in furthering the implementation of 
treaties 36  along with the importance of review and assessment procedures 37  and non-
governmental organisations in encouraging compliance.38  In terms of Mitchell’s classification 
of behavioural logics, the managerial model combines both logics: states are thought to act in 
their interests but also to respond to normative influences. 
2 Franck’s fairness model 
Writing at a similar time to the Chayeses, Franck’s focus is on critiquing international law 
using the metric of fairness, rather than the promotion of compliance with it.  However, in 
developing his thesis that international law is effective when it is fair, Franck argues that the 
perceived fairness of laws encourages states to comply voluntarily with those laws.39  Like the 
Chayeses, Franck recognises that the notion of sovereignty has been modified by the increasing 
                                                 
30 See Chapters 2 – 4 of Chayes and Chayes, above n 7. 
31 At 4 – 9. 
32 Crossen, above n 6, at 482. 
33 Chayes and Chayes, above n 7, at 25. 
34 Crossen, above n 6, at 482. 
35 Chayes and Chayes, above n 7, at 27. 
36 At 275. 
37 At 230. 
38 At 251. 
39 Franck, above n 9, at 8. 
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interdependence of the international community40 and emphasises that the making of legitimate 
international laws is a community activity.41  According to Franck, there are two aspects of 
fairness, one procedural and one substantive.  As to procedural fairness, a law will be seen as 
legitimate if it is made in accordance with right process.  There are four components 
contributing to legitimacy: the rule must be determinate,42 have symbolic validation,43 fits 
coherently within already existed rules and is applied coherently44 and finally adheres to the 
secondary rules of process by which the community gives it validity.45  As to substantive 
fairness, a law will be substantively fair if it equitably distributes resources.  Franck 
acknowledges that the two elements can pull in different directions as legitimacy favours order 
while fairness as distributive justice favours change.46  However, as Crossen summarises, 
Franck’s argument is that “fairness provides the conceptual tool to manage the tension between 
change and order.” 47   Franck does not specifically address the efficacy of coercive 
enforcement.48  In terms of the behavioural logic that it applies, Franck’s theory (like the 
managerial model) applies both logics; it relies on the logic of consequences when it assumes 
that states will have regard to their interests when it comes to distributive justice but also relies 
on the logic of appropriateness in arguing that states respond to the norms of fairness.49 
3 Koh’s transnational legal process 
According to Koh, both the Chayeses and Franck rely on norm-internalization to encourage 
voluntary compliance but without explaining how that process occurs.50  Koh fills this gap 
through elucidation of the “transnational legal process”.  Internalization of norms through the 
transnational legal process involves repetition of interactions, interpretations and 
internalization.51  The process starts with an interaction of transnational actors which leads to 
an interpretation or enunciation of a global norm52 which ideally will be integrated into the 
state’s internal decision-making system.  That internalized norm then governs future 
interactions which lead to further interpretations and internalizations.  The example that Koh 
gives is President Reagan’s decision to “reinterpret” the ABM Treaty to allow the US to build 
a space-based missile system.  Owing to sustained discussion and debate with Congress and 
                                                 
40 At 3 – 4.  
41 At 29. 
42 At 30. 
43 At 34. 
44 At 38 
45 At 41. 
46 At 7. 
47 Crossen, above n 6 at 484. 
48 At 485. 
49 Harold Hongju Koh “Why do nations obey international law?” (1997) 106 Yale Law Journal 2599 at 2642. 
50 At 2646. 
51 At 2649. 
52 At 2646. 
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figures from non-government organisations (NGOs) over the course of the next eight years, 
Reagan had to back down and interpret the treaty in its original way.53  This example also 
shows the role that NGOs can play in the transnational process.54  Koh argues that not only 
does transnational legal process explain why states comply with norms, it also suggests ways 
to encourage non-compliant states to comply.55  NGOs within a country can play an important 
role in assisting to internalize norms.  For instance, NGOs may be more willing to raise human 
rights issues with a non-complying state, as compared to other states who are constrained by 
political or economic concerns.56  Interaction with NGOs or other domestic actors still lead to 
the same interpretation and internalization process.  This process helps to change a state’s 
interests and identity.57  In terms of the behavioural logic that this process embodies, it fits best 
within the logic of appropriateness as states are internalizing norms that affect their identities 
and hence what they view as appropriate or inappropriate. 
4 Guzman’s reputation theory 
Guzman’s reputation theory fits squarely within the behavioural logic of consequences.  In 
contrast to the theories outlined above, Guzman argues that enforcement mechanisms are 
required to ensure compliance with treaties.  States will enter into treaties and comply with 
their international obligations when the costs of non-compliance outweighed the benefits of 
non-compliance.  The costs of non-compliance can include retaliatory sanctions and any 
reputational damage which “affects a state’s ability to make commitments in the future.”58    If 
states want to enter into agreements in the future whereby they promise certain actions in return 
for concessions, they need enough reputational capital that other states trust that they will 
actually fulfil their commitments.  Non-compliance reduces the value of a state’s reputational 
capital.  However, the reputational cost of non-compliance will depend on the severity of the 
breach, the reasons for it, other state’s knowledge of the breach, the clarity of the international 
obligation, any implicit obligations on that state and any subsequent regime change.59  Guzman 
also argues that creating internationally binding agreements is not necessary in some 
coordination situations but in situations when the incentives of the other party are not clear, 
entering a binding agreement increases reputational cost and hence the likelihood that both 
parties will comply.  Like the Chayeses, Guzman recognises that sanctions can be costly for 
the state imposing them60 but Guzman maintains that sanctions can still be efficient in certain 
                                                 
53 At 2646 – 2647. 
54 At 2646. 
55 At 2655. 
56 At 2655. 
57 At 2655. 
58 Guzman, above n 10, at 1845. 
59 At 1861 – 1865. 
60 At 1867. 
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situations when there will be repeated interactions and the benefit of increased compliance in 
the future outweighs the immediate cost of sanctions.61 
5 The enforcement model  
At the other end of the spectrum is Downs et al’s model, arising from political economic theory. 
Downs et al argue that a key reason for high levels of compliance with international agreements 
is that the obligations that states take on when entering into many agreements are “shallow”, 
in that they do not require much change in behaviour from how the states would have acted in 
the absence of the agreement.62  If deeper cooperation is required, then more comprehensive 
enforcement measures are essential to deter and punish defection from the agreement.63  Like 
Guzman’s theory, this fits within Mitchell’s logic of consequences. 
 
III Existing protection of marine biodiversity in ABNJ 
C Distinction between EEZ and the High Seas 
Conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity present unique challenges to the 
international legal system; how can the international community protect marine biodiversity in 
areas over which no state has authority?  One solution to this problem is to put greater areas of 
the ocean under the control of particular states,64 a solution contained within the UNCLOS65 
which codified the concept of a 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).  Around a 
one third of the world’s oceans66 come within the EEZs of coastal states and so are under the 
control of those coastal states for the purposes of:67 
 
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, 
of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil 
 
This regime allows states such as New Zealand68 to set sustainable catch limits for fish stocks 
within their EEZs69 and enforce those limits.  
 
However, the EEZ regime still leaves around two thirds of the oceans beyond the jurisdiction 
of coastal states.  The water column in this area is called the high seas and the seabed is called 
                                                 
61 At 1868. 
62 Downs, Rocke and Barsoom, above n 10, at 391. 
63 At 387. 
64 Donald R Rothwell and Tim Stephens The international law of the sea (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon, 2010) at 297. 
65 See Part V of UNCLOS. 
66 Rothwell and Stephens, above n 64, at 82. 
67 UNCLOS, art 56(1)(a). 
68 See the Fisheries Act 1996. 
69 UNCLOS, art 61. 
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the Area – both are ABNJ.  It is in these areas that the sovereignty norms of the international 
legal system clash with the objective of conservation of marine “biodiversity beyond national 
jurisdiction” (BBNJ).  Rather than states exercising sovereignty over particular areas of the 
high seas, states have the right to have vessels flying its flag sailing the high seas.70  Flagged 
vessels are subject to the law of their flag states and it is only rarely that other states can 
intervene in the activities of vessels flagged to other states.71  As to the activities that flagged 
ships can undertake on the high seas, the overarching principle is “freedom of the high seas” 
which, amongst other freedoms, allows all vessels to engage in fishing on the high seas.72  
However, this right is limited by the succeeding provisions (discussed below).  
D Existing conservation duties relating to marine biodiversity in ABNJ 
6 UNCLOS 
The principal agreement relating to marine biodiversity in ABNJ is the UNCLOS, which 
imposes a number of conservation duties on states including that: 
 
(a) States have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment.73 
(b) All States have the duty to take, or to cooperate with other States in taking such 
measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the 
living resources of the high seas. 74  The duty to cooperate extends to seeking to 
negotiate necessary conservation measures with other states exploiting the same living 
resources. 
(c) Coastal states, taking into account the best scientific evidence available, shall ensure 
through proper conservation and management measures that the maintenance of the 
living resources in their respective EEZs are not endangered by over-exploitation.75 
(d) Where fish stocks straddle an EEZ and the high seas, or two EEZs, coastal states and 
states fishing in the high seas shall seek, either directly or through appropriate 
subregional or regional organizations, to agree upon the measures necessary for 
conserve those stocks.76 
(e) Coastal states and states fishing for highly migratory species (as listed in Annex I), shall 
cooperate directly or through appropriate international organizations with a view to 
ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of optimum utilization of such 
species throughout the region.77 
                                                 
70 Art 91. 
71 Art 92. 
72 Art 116. 
73 Art 192. 
74 Art 117. 
75 Art 61(2). 
76 Art 63. 
77 Art 64. 
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(f) When states have reasonable grounds for believing that planned activities under their 
jurisdiction or control may cause substantial pollution of or significant and harmful 
changes to the marine environment, they shall as far as practicable, assess the potential 
effects of such activities on the marine environment and shall communicate reports of 
the results of such assessments to the competent international organizations, to be made 
available to all states.78 
7 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
The CBD79 provides that contracting parties have a duty to cooperate with other contracting 
parties in respect of ABNJ for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.80  
In ABNJ, the provisions of the CBD only apply to “processes and activities… carried out under 
its jurisdiction or control”81 whereas within national jurisdiction, the provisions apply to the 
“components of biological diversity”.82  The CBD also provides that states are to:83 
 
Introduce appropriate procedures requiring environmental impact assessment of its 
proposed projects that are likely to have significant adverse effects on biodiversity with a 
view to avoiding or minimising such effects. 
 
Under the auspices of the CBD, guidelines for environmental impact assessments (EIAs) on 
marine biodiversity have been prepared but they are not binding.84  While all state parties have 
conservation duties, the fulfilment of those duties by developing country parties expressly 
depends on developed country parties effectively implementing their commitments under the 
Convention related to financial resources and transfer of technology.85 The CBD also contains 
provisions relating to access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing which are elaborated on 
in the Nagoya Protocol.86  However, the Nagoya Protocol does not apply to biodiversity in 
ABNJ.  
 
                                                 
78 UNCLOS, art 206. 
79 Convention on Biological Diversity 1760 UNTS 79 (opened for signature 5 June 1992, entered into force 29 
December 1993). 
80 Art 5. 
81 Art 4(b). 
82 Art 4(a). 
83 Art 14(1)(a). 
84 See Jeff A. Ardron and others “The sustainable use and conservation of biodiversity in ABNJ: What can be 
achieved using existing international agreements?” (2014) 49 Marine Policy 98 at 102. 
85 CBD, art 20(4). 
86 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from 
their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity (opened for signature on 2 February 2011, entered into 
force 12 October 2014). 
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One of the CBD’s streams of work has been the identification of “ecologically or biologically 
significant areas” (EBSAs) in ABNJ.87  However, the CBD is subject to UNCLOS88 and in any 
event does not have the institutional infrastructure to create marine protected areas.  While 
there are some organisations that have declared marine protected areas, there are coordination 
problems in using the research prepared under the auspices of the CBD.  For instance, in 
relation to the Sargasso Sea Alliance’s proposed marine protected areas, NAFO89 and ICCAT’s 
scientific committees would not accept the CBD EBSA assessment and undertook their own 
confirmatory assessment as to whether that particular area should be protected.90  
8 The Fish Stocks Agreement 
UNCLOS did not provide any detail in relation to the operation or obligations of regional 
fisheries management organisations (RFMOs), and (given that it was opened for signature in 
1982) did not take into account developments in thinking about conservation.  The Fish Stocks 
Agreement,91 an implementing agreement, filled these gaps in relation to straddling stocks and 
highly migratory stocks.  Like the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),92 the Fish 
Stocks Agreement recognises the ecosystem approach to conservation and seeks to apply the 
precautionary approach.  The key innovation of the Fish Stocks Agreement is the institutional 
provisions relating to regional fisheries management organisation (RFMOs) regulating 
straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.  Only states that are members of a RFMO or part 
of a cooperative arrangement would have access to the fishery resources to which the Treaty 
applies.93  Within the territory of the particular RFMO, the RFMO member states are to “agree 
on and comply with conservation measures to ensure the long-term sustainability of straddling 
fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks” and as appropriate agree on catch or fishing effort 
allocations, and agree on standards for collecting, reporting, verification and exchange of data 
on the fish stocks.94  Importantly, members of the relevant RFMO have the right to board other 
vessels flagged to other states that are party to the Fish Stocks Agreement to ensure compliance 
with the relevant conservation measures.95  Any evidence of a violation is then remitted back 
to the flag state of the vessel concerned to allow the flag state to take enforcement action.  If 
                                                 
87 Daniel C. Dunn and others “The Convention on Biological Diversity's Ecologically or Biologically Significant 
Areas: Origins, development, and current status” (2014) 49 Marine Policy 137.  
88 Pursuant to art 22 of the CBD. 
89 Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation. 
90 International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas. 
91 United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (“Fish Stocks Agreement”) 2167 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 4 December 1995, 
entered into force 11 December 2001). 
92 CBD, above n 79.  
93 Fish Stocks Agreement, art 8(4). 
94 Art 10. 
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the flag state takes no action, the RFMO member can take enforcement action.96  However, 
there is nothing to prevent the flag state from taking inadequate enforcement action, and there 
are economic incentives to do so.97  The ability for non-flag states to take enforcement action 
within the RFMO area was the most controversial provision in the Fish Stocks Agreement as 
it is a significant exception to the principle of flag state sovereignty.98  There are now a number 
of species-specific and general RFMOs managing various parts of the oceans.99 
9 Other fisheries instruments 
In terms of conservation of fisheries, a number of other instruments have been promulgated 
since UNCLOS, including the 1993 FAO100 Compliance Agreement101 and the voluntary 1995 
FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries.  The FAO Compliance Agreement 
strengthens the responsibilities of flag states by, amongst other provisions, requiring its state 
parties to take such measures necessary to ensure that fishing vessels flagged to them do not 
engage in any activity that undermines the effectiveness of international conservation and 
management measures.102  It also requires state parties only to authorize fishing vessels if that 
state party is satisfied that it is able to exercise effectively it responsibility under the Agreement 
in respect of that fishing vessel.103  The FAO Compliance Agreement also contains provisions 
for a register of fishing vessels and provisions preventing the prompt reflagging of delinquent 
vessels.  The FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries is voluntary and sets out 
“principles and international standards of behaviour for responsible practices with a view to 
ensuring the effective conservation, management and development of living aquatic resources, 
with due respect for the ecosystem and biodiversity.”104   
10 Port State Measures Agreement 
Most recently, the FAO Conference adopted the 2009 Agreement on Port State Measures to 
Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing,105 in addition to the 
various instruments allowing port states to detain vessels that do not meet a certain standard of 
                                                 
96 Art 21. 
97 Jessica K Ferrell “Controlling flags of convenience: one measure to stop overfishing of collapsing fish stocks” 
(2005) 35 Environmental Law 323. 
98 Giselle Vigneron “Compliance and International Environmental Agreements: a case study of the 1995 United 
Nations straddling fish stocks agreement” (1997) 10 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 581 at 600.  
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100 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 
101 Agreement to promote compliance with international conservation and management measures by fishing 
vessels on the high seas (opened for acceptance 24 November 1993, entered into force 24 April 2003). 
102 Art III(1)(a). 
103 Art III(3). 
104 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries adopted 31 October 1995. 
105 Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing (opened for signature 22 November 2009, not yet in force). 
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repair.106  The Port State Measures Agreement has not yet come into force but when it does, 
state parties may deny vessels from entering its ports when it has sufficient evidence that the 
vessel has been carrying out illegal, unreported or unregulated (IUU) fishing or fishing-related 
activities.107  Port state parties will also be able to inspect fishing vessels that enter the port to 
determine whether there is evidence of IUU fishing or related activities.108  The results of 
inspections will be shared with other state parties with a view to coordinating inspections.109 
 
Despite the Fish Stocks Agreement, and the other agreements described above that are aimed 
at preventing overfishing, in 2012, up to one-third of all commercial fish species were 
estimated to be overfished, 110  highlighting the need for greater protective measures.  
Conservation of marine biodiversity is still hampered by the fundamental reliance on flag states 
to enforce law on vessels flagged to them.  Even when there is a regional fisheries management 
organisation in an area that has set a particular catch limit, ships can avoid the limitation by 
flagging to a state that is not party to the Fish Stocks Agreement.  Alternatively, a ship could 
be flagged to a state that is party to the Fish Stocks Agreement but does not comply with its 
obligations to exercise control over its flagged vessels.  While UNCLOS requires a vessel to 
have a “genuine link” with a state in order to be flagged to that state,111 “genuine link” is not 
defined and states interpret the phrase in different ways.112  As outlined above, while states 
have a general duty to taken measures necessary for the conservation of living resources in the 
high seas, in practice some states do not take active steps to prevent their nationals from taking 
actions that jeopardise conservation efforts.  By flying “flags of convenience” (“FOC”) when 
the flag state is not a signatory to the relevant agreement, ships can effectively avoid most if 
not all regulation of their activities on the high seas.  Alternatively, ships can fly “flags of non-
compliance” (FONCs) which is when the flag state signs up to an international agreement but 
does not exercise control of its flagged vessels.  Despite a number of instruments that seek to 
require states to only flag vessels over which they will be able to exercise control, the practice 
of using FOCs continues to cause problems and is associated with IUU fishing.113 
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11 Marine pollution framework 
The UNCLOS sets out a comprehensive framework on states to prevent marine pollution from 
land-based sources, vessels, dumping, activities in the seabed and from the atmosphere.114  It 
also gives powers to port states to inspect vessels to gather evidence in relation to any possible 
discharge in breach of the relevant international standards.115  Port states can also detain vessels 
that are unseaworthy.116  In addition to the UNCLOS framework, there are several conventions 
dealing with different aspects of pollution117 and a number of regional seas bodies that deal 
with pollution in particular areas.118  While the mandate of some of the regional seas bodies 
has expanded to include matters such as environmental impact assessments,119 there are still 
coordination problems with setting up marine protected areas given the number of other 
institutions, such as RFMOs, that may have an interest in a particular area.120  
 
IV Gaps in the existing protection of marine biodiversity in ABNJ 
 
The “package” of issues that negotiations are to focus on, all relate to existing gaps within the 
legal and institutional framework relating to marine biodiversity in ABNJ.  In relation to 
MGRs, there are two diametrically opposed positions as to whether marine genetic resources 
are subject to the common heritage of humanity approach or are subject to freedom of the high 
seas.121  MGRs are not covered by the benefit sharing regime in the Nagoya Protocol to the 
CBD.  
 
In relation to area-based conservation measures, while there are a number of different 
institutions that may be able to contribute towards setting up marine protected areas (including 
RFMOs and regional seas organisations), there is little coordination between them – a matter 
that is likely to be remedied in any proposed instrument.  It is also possible that any proposed 
instrument will contain provisions relating to the prevention of IUU fishing by eliminating the 
use of FOCs.  In practice, action on this issue will be required if marine protected areas are to 
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work effectively.  Controlling FOCs will require widespread acceptance of the instrument (in 
compliance with the parameters of the resolution) so that few states remain who will flag FOCs. 
 
In relation to environmental impact assessments (EIAs), while there are requirements in 
UNCLOS and in the CBD to carry out these assessments, there are different thresholds at which 
EIAs are required and no binding guidelines as to how the EIAs are to be carried out.  The 
proposed instrument could solve those problems.122 
 
In relation to capacity building and transfer of marine technology, again UNCLOS contains 
some general provisions relating to these topics123 but with no real detail.  According to 
Churchill and Lowe:124 
 
Little improvement in this position [in relation to transfer of marine technology] is likely 
to result from the provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention, which in Boczek’s view 
‘do not lay down clear legal obligations but only establish certain standards of conduct 
which to a large extent reflect the already existing practice … and are not likely to have 
any immediate discernible legal effect upon the transfer of marine technology’. 
 
V Compliance and enforcement mechanisms to be included in the proposed 
instrument 
There are three broad types of compliance and enforcement mechanisms: incentives, 
disincentives and transparency measures.  There is overlap between these categories given that 
the fact that the regime is transparent will act as an incentive for compliance and a disincentive 
to non-compliance.  Reporting and monitoring mechanisms are the primary transparency 
mechanisms while sanctions are the classic disincentive and financial assistance the classic 
incentive.  The appropriateness of these mechanisms, along with a number of other mechanisms 
will be analysed in the following sections.   
E Reporting and monitoring mechanisms 
At a base level, any new instrument should contain reporting and monitoring obligations so 
that states have to engage with their substantive obligations and inform the international 
community what steps they are taking to fulfil them.125  Reporting and monitoring mechanisms 
are recognised as being important by theories all along the enforcement continuum.  From a 
managerial perspective, reporting and monitoring obligations require state bureaucracies to at 
least to engage with the international instrument.  The actual reports contribute to the 
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transparency of the regime and give states reassurance that other states are taking action.  
Reporting and monitoring will also highlight which states are having problems with 
compliance, and need assistance.  From a pure enforcement perspective, states must be able to 
know the extent of other states non-compliance to be able to take enforcement actions against 
them.  Reporting and monitoring requirements also bring into play reputational costs and 
benefits; a state who is considering non-compliance will know that there is a high likelihood 
of the non-compliance being disclosed to the international community at large.   
 
As to the content of the reporting and monitoring obligations, there should be an obligation to 
report on the steps that a state has taken to comply with the duties set out in the proposed 
instruments through domestic implementation of those duties.  For instance, in relation to EIAs, 
states should report the steps they have taken to ensure that their nationals undertake proper 
EIAs in relation to activities in marine ABNJ.  In relation to marine-protected areas, states 
should report on the regional organisations in which they are participants and the steps that are 
being taken there to implement marine protected areas.  Depending on the strength of any 
substantive provisions in the proposed instrument relating to flag state duties, there could be a 
requirement to report on the criteria that a vessel must fulfil before it will be flagged to that 
state.  This would allow for “white”126 or “black” lists127 to be established – either of states that 
are responsibly exercising their right to flag vessels or states that are being irresponsible 
respectively.  These lists could be used as the basis for preferential treatment or sanctions when 
ships flagged to those states arrive in port states.128  Provision for a global register of all vessels 
could also be helpful in ensuring that FOCs cannot easily reflag and continue breaching 
conservation measures.  
F Dispute resolution mechanisms  
As regards enforcement mechanisms, there should be provision for peaceful resolution of 
disputes.  In terms of formal dispute resolution between two state parties, reference could be 
made to the UNCLOS dispute resolution procedures, though with provision for states that are 
not party to UNCLOS but will be to the new agreement.  The Fish Stocks Agreement makes 
reference to UNCLOS’ dispute resolution mechanisms in this manner.129  If parties cannot 
agree otherwise, the default option in UNCLOS is binding arbitration.   
G Non-compliance procedure 
In addition to dispute resolution provisions, the proposed instrument should set up a non-
compliance procedure (NCP).130  NCPs have become popular in multilateral environmental 
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agreements in recent decades.  A NCP usually allows a state party, the treaty organisation or 
the non-complying state to bring the state’s non-compliance to the attention of a compliance 
committee. 131   The non-complying state then has to justify why it has not complied 
(contributing to the norm-internalization process) and the compliance committee can offer 
technical or financial assistance if it feels it is necessary.  NCPs are well-suited to multilateral 
agreements as they avoid the necessity for a state to have suffered loss for that state to take a 
claim against another state for breaching the instrument.  In multilateral agreements, as the 
proposed implementing agreement would be, it can be difficult to prove loss as a result of 
another state’s non-compliance.132  Some NCPs also provide for the involvement of the public 
or NGOs who can bring non-compliance to the attention of the compliance committee.133  
Depending on the type of penalties for non-compliance (if any), there could be a separate 
committee to sanction states whose non-compliance is ongoing and unjustified.  A similar split 
in committees was used in the Kyoto Protocol NCP.134 
 
The term “non-compliance procedure” was not in use at the time the Chayeses wrote their book 
on compliance.135  However, NCPs are very much in line with the managerial approach to 
compliance as such a procedure recognises that one of the primary causes of non-compliance 
is lack of capacity.  The NCP also allows for the removal of ambiguity in the interpretation of 
the treaty if the compliance committee can give an opinion on interpretation. 136   These 
interpretations may be more helpful to ongoing regime development than a binding decisions 
from a dispute between two state parties.137  The compliance committee will have the relevant 
experience to be able to interpret the treaty in a way that is consistent with the actual 
implementation of the treaty across all parties.  A NCP also brings into play reputational risks, 
as per Guzman’s theory.138  States know that they may have to go before a committee of 
representatives from other states to justify their non-compliance.  This may in itself 
disincentivise non-compliance where possible.   
H Review of the effectiveness of the instrument 
The proposed instrument could include a review mechanism similar to that contained in the 
Fish Stocks Agreement. 139   The review would be of the effectiveness of the proposed 
instrument in conserving and promoting the sustainable use of marine biodiversity in ABNJ.  
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This review mechanism would encourage party engagement with the instrument and would 
highlight any systemic issues that had arisen or any improvements that could be made.  For 
instance, one of the recommendations from the first review of the Fish Stocks Agreement was 
that the financial assistance mechanism under that Agreement needed to be promoted.140  When 
the Agreement was re-reviewed, as a result of that recommendation, it was found that use of 
the fund had increased dramatically.141 
I Financial assistance 
As mentioned above, one of the primary causes of non-compliance according to the managerial 
model is lack of capacity.  Providing financial assistance to states to assist with compliance is 
likely to increase the effectiveness of the instrument.  The provision of financial assistance may 
also make the instrument more fair in a substantive, distributive justice sense, given that many 
of the threats to marine biodiversity have arisen from the industrialisation of developed 
countries.  If the instrument is perceived as fair, developing states may be more likely to sign 
up to and comply with the agreement.  Financial assistance is a feature in a number of 
prominent multilateral environmental agreements including the CBD, the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”)142 and its subsidiary instrument the 
Kyoto Protocol143 and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.144  
This suggests that to encourage developing states to enter into an agreement whereby those 
states take on further responsibilities (for instance in relation to control of vessels flagged to 
their state), some form of financial assistance will need to be provided.  However, developed 
states are less willing to contribute funds to international regimes in recent times.145  One 
possibility would be to require entities who want to use MGRs to pay some sort of license fee 
or royalties which could be used for fund the financial assistance mechanism under the 
instrument. 
J Enforcement by non-flag states 
There are situations when non-flag states can take some sort of enforcement action against a 
vessel that is suspected of not complying with conservation measures relating to the high seas.  
As outlined above, the Fish Stocks Agreement allows non-flag states to board a vessel that is 
flagged to another party to the Fish Stocks Agreement to ensure compliance with the relevant 
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conservation measures.  The other situation is when a suspected IUU vessel is seeking to enter 
a port state.  Under the Port State Measures Agreement when it comes into force, a port state 
will be able to inspect to determine whether there is evidence of the vessel fishing in an IUU 
way.  Both methods are controversial as they infringe the principle of flag state sovereignty.  
The new instrument could incorporate similar provisions or given that the UNGA expressly 
states that the new instrument is not to undermine existing instruments, the new instrument 
could encourage states to ratify those two agreements.  Allowing states to take enforcement 
action against vessels not flagged to them is an important mechanism deterring IUU fishing.  
Many IUU vessels will be flying FOCs or flags of non-compliance (FONCs) which means that 
it is very unlikely that the flag state is going to take any enforcement action against the vessel. 
K Coercive sanctions  
Sanctions against states for non-compliance are likely to be unproductive as it may 
disincentivise participation in the agreement and if enforcement actually took place, may take 
resources away from states which could be used for enforcement against non-complying 
vessels.  The Chayeses’ analysis of the downsides of enforcement is convincing.  However, an 
agreed sanctions regime that any state could apply against infringing vessels (whatever the flag) 
rather than states, could be useful in combating FOCs.  This would mean that whichever state 
was seeking to take enforcement action against a vessel that was not flagged to it for breaches 
of high seas conservation measures, there would be a set of agreed regulations and fines or 
penalties for breaching them.  If these penalties could be agreed, it might lessen the concerns 
of flag states about allowing other states to take enforcement action against their nationals, as 
there would be certainty as to what punishment would be applied.   
 
VI Conclusion 
The international community has recognised that there are gaps in the international regime 
relating to the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in ABNJ and have 
agreed to negotiate an instrument under the UNCLOS to ameliorate the current regulatory and 
governance deficits.  The negotiations will focus around conservation tools such as marine 
protected areas and environmental impact assessments as well as the distribution of benefits 
from MGRs and capacity building and transfer of marine technology.  To be effective in 
conserving and sustainably using marine biodiversity in ABNJ, the substantive duties that 
states agree to in the proposed instrument must be capable of actually curbing the current 
threats to biodiversity including IUU fishing.  This paper has focussed on the types of 
mechanisms that should be included in the proposed instrument (whatever the substantive 
duties) to promote compliance with those duties.  However, if the substantive duties are too 
shallow, then even perfect compliance with the duties will not result in any improvement in the 
protection of biodiversity.   
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To inform this analysis, Part II of the paper surveyed the most prominent theories as to why 
states do or do not comply with international law.  Each theory highlights an important theme: 
from the managerial model that non-compliance is ofter as a result of lack of capacity and so 
assistance with meeting obligations is likely to be effective; from Franck that fairness in a 
procedural and substantive sense in important in encouraging states to comply; from Koh that 
the norms are internalized through interaction; from Guzman that states will take into account 
reputational costs; and finally from Downs et al that compliance should not be mistaken for 
effectiveness and that deep cooperation is usually absent from international agreements.  On 
the enforcement question, the Chayeses do present a convincing argument that coercive 
sanctions are likely to be costly and ineffectual in relation to enforcing multilateral international 
environmental agreements.   
 
A number of the theorists emphasised the importance of the international community and 
international interactions in encouraging compliance with international law.  This supports an 
argument that states should try to involve as many stats as possible in the proposed instrument.  
Even if some states are non-compliant, it is better to have states involved and potentially 
internalizing norms or changing interests rather then excluding them from the community.  
There was also theoretical support for negotiating clear rules to encourage compliance. 
 
Part III described the existing regimes in relation to conservation of marine biodiversity in 
ABNJ.  This highlighted that the duties on states in relation to important conservation tools, 
including marine protected areas and environmental impact assessments are lacking in detail.  
It also emphasised how many different intstitutions are involved in various aspects of ocean 
governance, which presents coordination problems.  Part IV identified the gaps that the 
proposed instrument will fill, while Part V examined the types of compliance and enforcement 
mechanisms the proposed instrument should have and linked the proposed mechanisms back 
to the compliance theories discussed in Part II.   
 
In conclusion, the instrument should have reporting and monitoring requirements, dispute 
resolution mechanisms, a financial assistance mechanism and a non-compliance procedure.  
These mechanisms will encourage engagement by the state with its obligations (reporting and 
monitoring), will incentivise that states to take active steps in implementation (financial 
assistance mechanism), will help states to comply if they are having problems (non-compliance 
procedures), and will raise reputational concerns that will encourage compliance (reporting and 
monitoring, and non-compliance procedures).  The other two mechanisms mentioned relate to 
action against FOCs by allowing enforcement by non-flag states and a universal set of 
regulations and penalties for high seas fisheries violations.  It would also be useful to have a 
review provision in the instrument so that its overall efficacy can be assessed. 
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